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The disagreement that exists between my learned colleague Kenneth Armstrong and myself concerns the
question whether the Council is legally obligated to propose a candidate that, following the election, the
Parliament has committed to support. The argument supporting that claim is, at its core, simple. The elections
have produced a Parliament that is committed to elect a particular candidate as Commission President (here:
Juncker). If that is the result the election has produced, the Council would not be taking into account the
elections, as it is obligated to do, if it made a proposal that did not reflect that fact. To challenge this argument
Armstrong makes three points.
The first is conceptual. The Treaty uncontroversially has given the power to nominate the candidate for the
Commission Presidency to the Council and not to the Parliament. Parliament can´t presume to nominate
someone by making them Spitzenkandidaten. But of course nobody is claiming that the Parliament has the
power to nominate the candidate for Commission President. By naming Spitzenkandidaten Parliament never
claimed to be nominating a Commission President. European party groupings merely articulated their political
commitment to elect their Spitzenkandidat, should he be able to gain the majorities support in Parliament after
the elections. It is the power of the Parliament to elect the Commission President. Of course parliamentary party
grouping need no explicit constitutional authorization to make such political commitments. (Not surprisingly, the
Spitzenkandidaten do not have constitutional status in Germany either).
So there is no dispute about the powers of the relevant actors. The question is what legal principles, if any,
govern the exercise of these powers. Are there circumstances under which the Parliament is under a duty to
elect the candidate nominated by the Council, notwithstanding their commitments? (I´m skeptical). Is the Council
under an obligation to nominate the person who, following the elections enjoys the committed support of a
majority in Parliament? (Yes). But whatever you might take the right answer to be, it is clear that focusing on who
has the power to nominate won´t resolve anything. In Britain it is the undisputed Royal Prerogative to appoint
and dismiss a Prime Minister. But everybody understands that the governing principle relating to the exercise of
that power is that the leader of the majority party gets to lead the Commons. The EU is not Britain, of course, and
the European Council, though perhaps also part of an ancien régime of sorts, is no monarch. But the point in
both cases is that principles of democracy restrict the way that power may be legitimately exercised by more
indirectly legitimated Heads of State. (The claim implicitly made by Chancellor Merkel and now explicitly made
by the British Prime Minister, that the Parliament is behaving in a way that violates the Treaty when it insists that
it would not elect a Commission President nominee that is not Juncker, is obfuscating nonsense.)
Second, Armstrong is right that the Treaty does not provide a clear resolution of the issue, even though it could
have, if the parties had wanted that. But what follows from that for the interpretation of the Treaty? It is not
unusual for Constitutions or Treaties to leave things vague or abstract. The current Art. 17 TEU does not have to
be be read as inviting only intergovernmental deliberations and negotiations behind closed doors between the
Parliament and the Council. It can also be read as a call for legal interpretation and concretization by scholars
and courts, whose interpretation of these provisions would inevitably be informed by the principles of
representative democracy as it is laid out in the Treaty.
It is exactly with these principles in mind that one must read Armstrongs claims about the virtue of deliberative
intergovernmentalism and what he calls my “irresponsibly over-optimistic” views about the capacity of the EP to
generate a genuine representative European democracy that is inappropriately neglectful of “the powerful
capacity of the European Council – through its representation of individuals democratically accountable to their
own national electorates – to seek also to promote a vision of a common European good.” This is the right kind
of argument to make. The problem is that it is substantively wrong (more on this here). Here it must suffice to
say that I´m perfectly happy to turn that charge around. Armstrong appears to be irresponsibly beholden to
collectively exercised executive power in Europe, notwithstanding the structural weakness of national
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parliaments as institutions to hold accountable their governments as far as their action in the Council is
concerned and with little awareness of the link between the way politics has been conducted in the past and the
significant degree of citizens disinterest and discontent. Thankfully the Treaties provide the basis for leaving
behind the ancien régime of executive federalism and pushes towards a more democratic politics in Europe.
Ironically the path to a brighter democratic future in Europe depends to a nontrivial extent on the Council acting
in conformity with its duty to nominate a perhaps less than inspiring steady hand of the past as Commission
President.
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